

Remuneration Disclosures

Financial year ended 31 March 2026



This document sets out remuneration disclosures for TAL Daiichi Life Australia Pty Limited, TAL Life Limited, TAL Life Insurance Services Limited and their subsidiaries ('the Group' or 'TAL') for the financial year ended 31 March 2026. These disclosures have been prepared in accordance with APRA's Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration ('CPS 511') on the basis that TAL Life Limited is a Significant Financial Institution.

Governance of the remuneration framework

Role of the Board and Remuneration, Nominations & People Committee

The main bodies overseeing remuneration are the Board¹ and the Remuneration, Nominations & People Committee ('the Committee'). The Board has a minimum of five directors including an independent Chair, with the majority required to be non-executive directors. The Committee has a minimum of three members, with all members required to be non-executive directors and the majority required to be independent. The Board is ultimately responsible for TAL's remuneration framework and its effective application. The Committee is responsible for overseeing the design, operation and monitoring of the remuneration framework. During the financial year, the Board held eight meetings and the Committee held six meetings (including a joint meeting with the Risk Committee).

Annually (or more frequently, if required), the Board reviews and approves the Remuneration Policy. The Board also reviews and approves variable remuneration arrangements and outcomes, which includes an assessment of whether risk outcomes are appropriately reflected in aggregate and individual variable remuneration outcomes (for certain roles), and whether any remuneration adjustments should be made.

The Board's assessment is supported by input from the Risk Committee, Risk Office and Internal Audit, including through a formal joint meeting of the Committee and the Risk Committee. Specifically, the Board considers individual and Group risk outcomes in reviewing and approving:

- current year Short Term Incentive ('STI') outcomes for Specified Roles on an individual or aggregate basis, as required by CPS 511;
- the STI pool, including any upwards or downwards company modifier;
- the payment of deferred STIs awarded in prior financial years; and
- the vesting and/or payment of Long Term Incentive ('LTI') awards from prior financial years.

Remuneration framework reviews

During the financial year, TAL undertook its second annual review of the compliance of its remuneration framework with the requirements of CPS 511. This review did not identify any compliance gaps. TAL also undertook its first triennial review of the effectiveness of its remuneration framework. The remuneration framework was deemed to be effective overall.

External remuneration consultants

During the financial year, Ernst & Young was engaged to conduct TAL's first triennial effectiveness review and to provide ad hoc advice on other matters related to compliance with CPS 511. Aon was engaged to provide executive benchmarking.

Remuneration framework

Overview

The remuneration framework is designed to:

- align with TAL's business plan, strategic objectives and risk management framework;
- promote effective management of both financial and non-financial risks, sustainable performance and TAL's long-term soundness;
- comply with legal and regulatory obligations; and
- support the prevention and mitigation of conduct and other risk.

These objectives are supported by a range of features including the selection of appropriate financial and non-financial performance measures, the mix between short and long term variable remuneration, deferral arrangements and mechanisms to adjust variable remuneration to reflect individual and Group risk outcomes.

The Remuneration Policy applies to the Group and all its employees (permanent and fixed term) and any other individuals engaged directly by TAL under contract². The policy includes specific provisions for Specified Roles which includes the following types of positions.

¹ The Boards of TAL Daiichi Life Australia Pty Limited, TAL Life Limited and TAL Life Insurance Services Limited.

² TAL does not engage any individuals in Specified Roles who are not permanent or fixed term employees.

- Senior Managers: Group CEO & Managing Director and Executive Team members.
- Executive Directors: Executive Directors of TAL's APRA-regulated entities and other subsidiaries which could have a material potential impact on the Group's risk profile.
- Material Risk-Takers ('MRTs'): roles whose activities could have a material potential impact on the Group's risk profile, performance and long term-soundness. This includes certain senior roles with responsibility for areas such as product, pricing, portfolio management, capital management and asset management.
- Risk and Financial Control Personnel ('RFCP'): all line 2 risk and line 3 internal audit roles, and other senior roles whose main focus is financial or actuarial control.

Alignment of remuneration and performance outcomes

Variable remuneration is designed to align remuneration outcomes with TAL's business priorities and plan, strategic objectives, behavioural expectations, and risk management framework. Each component of variable remuneration is determined based on a mix of financial and non-financial metrics to support the delivery of sustainable business performance, promoting effective management of financial and non-financial risks.

All Specified Roles (excluding fixed term employees) participate in STI and select roles also participate in LTI. The key terms of the STI and LTI are set out under 'Design of variable remuneration plans' below. This includes the main financial and non-financial performance measures, how material weight is applied to non-financial measures, and how remuneration outcomes are linked to both Group and individual performance.

There may be circumstances where no variable remuneration is offered (e.g. fixed term employees). However, all employees and contractors are required to adhere to TAL's policies including its Code of Conduct. In the event of a material breach or misconduct, a range of consequences may apply including termination of employment or engagement.

Risk and financial control personnel

RFCP have a higher minimum weighting to non-financial performance measures of at least 60% (together with an appropriate pay mix) to reflect the independence and authority of those personnel carrying out their functions, reflect the purpose of their functions and ensure they are not unduly influenced by the performance of the business activities they control.

Variable remuneration outcomes for RFCP are subject to additional review, if required, to prevent conflicts of interest arising from outcomes being determined by the business areas that they are responsible for overseeing and challenging.

Actual variable remuneration outcomes (excluding LTIs) for RFCP for the financial year ranged between 7% and 26% of fixed remuneration. For RFCP in senior roles who participate in LTI, total variable remuneration outcomes (comprising actual STI and awarded LTI at maximum) ranged between 74% and 85% of fixed remuneration. During the financial year, there were no adjustments to reflect risk outcomes or any special payments¹ for RFCP.

Design of variable remuneration plans

Short term incentive

The STI is delivered in cash with performance assessed over the relevant financial year. The Board has full discretion over the payment of STIs. All individuals in Specified Roles (excluding fixed term employees) were eligible to participate in STI for the financial year. Individual STI outcomes are recommended based on the individual's overall performance which incorporates performance against goals, risk and compliance outcomes, and behaviours. Risk is a gateway and a modifier for STI outcomes.

It is a requirement that goals include a material weighting to non-financial performance measures of at least 40% (at least 60% for RFCP). The main financial measures for the CEO, certain Senior Managers (with profit and loss accountability) and MRTs include profit, expense management, revenue and capital management. For other Senior Managers and RFCP, financial measures are typically limited to expense management. The main non-financial measures include customer, partner, risk, people and strategic program delivery.

The STI pool is built on a bottom-up basis and funded provided a threshold level of financial performance is achieved. The pool (and individual outcomes) may be adjusted upwards or downwards if the Board determines to apply a company modifier, which considers a range of financial and non-financial factors. The key financial measures for determining the pool are profit which reflects current year performance and capacity to pay, and value of new business which reflects longer term sustainable business performance. Examples of non-financial outcomes considered at the pool level include risk outcomes and reputation.

For Senior Managers, 20% of the STI outcome is deferred and released over two years. Additional deferral may be applied if necessary to meet relevant minimum deferral requirements. STI outcomes may be adjusted (including to zero) through risk and compliance gateways and modifiers, and discretionary in-period adjustments. Deferred STIs may be adjusted via the application of malus and, for certain roles, clawback. Further detail is provided under 'Deferrals and adjustments' below.

¹ As defined in CPS 511, special payments include guaranteed bonuses, sign-on awards and severance payments.

Long term incentive

The LTI is delivered in cash with performance assessed over three financial years. All Senior Managers, Executive Directors, MRTs (including highly-paid MRTs), and 8% of RFCP participated in LTI for the financial year.

LTI vesting outcomes are determined with reference to a mix of financial and non-financial Group performance measures, with non-financial measures weighted 30%. The measures are designed to align with TAL's long term strategic plan and support effective risk management. For the financial year, the financial measure was growth in embedded value and the non-financial measure was partner reputation.

After the three year performance period, holding periods apply to certain roles to meet deferral requirements:

	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly-paid MRTs	Other MRTs
Proportion of LTI subject to holding period	100%	100%	One-third	Not applicable
Payments released	Equal instalments after years 4, 5 and 6	Equal instalments after years 4 and 5	After years 3 (2/3 rd) and 4 (1/3 rd)	In full after year 3

The Board has full discretion over the payment of LTIs and may determine to adjust the overall vesting outcome and/or individual vesting outcomes to reflect a range of factors, including risk outcomes. LTIs may be adjusted via the application of malus or, for certain roles, clawback. Further detail is provided under 'Deferrals and adjustments' below.

Mix of variable remuneration

For the CEO, Senior Managers and Executive Directors, the total variable remuneration opportunity comprises one third STI and two thirds LTI (based on target STI opportunity and awarded LTI at maximum). For other senior employees in Specified Roles (i.e. those who participate in LTI), the mix varies with LTI comprising between half and two thirds of the total variable remuneration opportunity. STI opportunities are expressed as a percentage of fixed remuneration and set with reference to seniority. The variation in mix is due to LTI awards which reflect a range of factors including typical market remuneration arrangements for different types of roles.

Other variable remuneration

Other types of variable remuneration may be awarded in exceptional circumstances outside the usual remuneration cycle including buy-out awards, retention awards, and completion or project-based incentives. Vesting of other variable remuneration awards is subject to meeting performance, risk and behaviour expectations, and awards may be adjusted downwards (including to zero) via discretionary in-period adjustments, malus or clawback (as relevant).

Deferrals and adjustments

Deferral of variable remuneration

TAL's variable remuneration arrangements have a range of performance periods, and payout and vesting schedules to reflect the possible range of risk and performance outcomes and the time horizon of risk. For cohorts which are subject to minimum deferral requirements, these requirements are met via participation in LTI, where possible. To the extent that the LTI performance period is shorter than the relevant minimum deferral period, additional holding periods apply. The arrangements for the financial year are set out under 'Long term incentive' above.

For certain roles, a portion of STI is deferred, as determined by the Board from time to time. The arrangements for the financial year are detailed above. In certain circumstances, it may be necessary to use deferred STI to meet minimum deferral requirements, for example, where there is no or insufficient LTI. In addition, any other variable remuneration awards may be subject to deferral where necessary to meet minimum deferral requirements.

Adjustments to variable remuneration

All variable remuneration is subject to adjustment and may be reduced downwards (including to zero) in a range of circumstances, including to reflect risk matters and to respond to conduct matters. This includes but is not limited to misconduct leading to significant adverse outcomes, a significant failure of financial or non-financial risk management, a significant failure or breach of accountability, fitness and propriety or compliance obligations, a significant error or a significant misstatement of criteria on which the variable remuneration determination was based and significant adverse outcomes for customers, beneficiaries or counterparties.

In addition to Board and management discretion at each decision point, the following variable remuneration adjustment tools are available:

- risk and compliance gateways and modifiers;
- discretionary in-period adjustments, i.e. adjustments prior to awards being made;
- malus, i.e. adjustments to variable remuneration which has been awarded but has not been paid or vested; and
- clawback for Senior Managers, Executive Directors and highly-paid MRTs, i.e. the recovery of paid or vested variable remuneration.

The process and principles for considering adjustments are outlined in the Remuneration Consequence Policy which supports the consistent and fair application of remuneration consequences with a focus on proportionality of the consequence to the severity of the matter. The key steps of the process include matter identification, matter assessment, determination of consequences, approval and communication.

Remuneration outcomes for the financial year

The table below provides details of fixed remuneration and 'realised' variable remuneration for Specified Roles¹.

A\$m		CEO	Other senior managers	Highly-paid MRTs	Other MRTs
Fixed remuneration					
1	Number of employees paid fixed remuneration	1	9	-	-
2	Total fixed remuneration ²	1.13	4.92	-	-
3	<i>of which: cash-based</i>	1.10	4.65	-	-
4	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-	-
5	<i>of which: other</i>	0.03	0.27	-	-
6	Average percentage increase in total fixed remuneration (row 2) on previous financial year	2.5%	2.6%	-	-
Variable remuneration					
7	Number of employees eligible for variable remuneration	1	9	-	-
8	Number of employees that received variable remuneration	1	9	-	-
9	Total variable remuneration ³	0.62	1.71	-	-
10	<i>of which: cash-based</i>	0.62	1.71	-	-
11	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-	-
12	<i>of which: other</i>	-	-	-	-
13	Total variable remuneration (row 9) that has been deferred	0.08	0.39	-	-
14	<i>of which: cash-based</i>	0.08	0.39	-	-
15	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-	-
16	<i>of which: other</i>	-	-	-	-
17	Average percentage increase (decrease) in total variable remuneration (row 9) on previous financial year ⁴	n/a	(24.6%)	-	-
Total remuneration					
18	Total remuneration (sum of rows 2 + 9)	1.75	6.53	-	-

¹ Individuals in Specified Roles as at the end of the financial year. Disclosures for MRTs (including highly-paid MRTs) not required as fewer than five individuals.

² Total fixed remuneration (annualised) as at the end of the financial year.

³ Excludes awards that satisfied all conditions during the financial year where the opportunity to earn the variable remuneration arose prior to the effective date of CPS 511 for TAL.

⁴ Includes individuals who held the same category of Specialised Role for the duration of both the current and prior financial years.

Special payments

The table provides details of any 'special payments' for Specified Roles¹, including guaranteed bonuses, sign-on awards and severance payments.

A\$m		CEO	Other senior managers	Highly-paid MRTs	Other MRTs
Guaranteed bonuses					
1	Number of employees paid a guaranteed bonus	-	-	-	-
2	Total guaranteed bonuses	-	-	-	-
Sign-on awards					
3	Number of employees paid a sign-on award	-	-	-	-
4	Total sign-on awards	-	-	-	-
Severance payments					
5	Number of employees paid a severance payment	-	-	-	-
6	Total severance payments	-	-	-	-

Deferred and adjusted variable remuneration

The table provides details of 'on foot' variable remuneration as at the end of the financial year (column A) together with variable remuneration which was 'realised' for the financial year (column B) and any downwards adjustments (column C) for Specified Roles¹.

A\$m		A Total amount of outstanding deferred variable remuneration post adjustments ²	B Total amount of variable remuneration not deferred post adjustments	C Total amount of downward adjustments to variable remuneration reported in columns A and B ³
CEO				
1	Total CEO	4.22	0.62	-
2	<i>of which: cash</i>	4.22	0.62	-
3	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-
4	<i>of which: other</i>	-	-	-
Other senior managers				
5	Total other senior managers	10.89	1.71	0.05
6	<i>of which: cash</i>	10.89	1.71	0.05
7	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-
8	<i>of which: other</i>	-	-	-
Highly-paid material-risk takers				
9	Total highly-paid MRTs	-	-	-
10	<i>of which: cash</i>	-	-	-
11	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-
12	<i>of which: other</i>	-	-	-
Other material risk-takers				
13	Total other MRTs	-	-	-
14	<i>of which: cash</i>	-	-	-
15	<i>of which: share-based awards</i>	-	-	-
16	<i>of which: other</i>	-	-	-
Total				
17	Total (sum of rows 1 + 5 + 9 + 13)	15.10	2.23	0.05

¹ Individuals in Specified Roles as at the end of the financial year. Disclosures for MRTs (including highly-paid MRTs) not required as fewer than five individuals.

² Excludes 'on foot' awards where the opportunity to earn the variable remuneration arose prior to the effective date of CPS 511 for TAL.

³ Includes adjustments to reflect Senior Manager responsibilities for matters in accordance with the Remuneration Consequence Policy. Further details of the approach, including key triggers, are set out under 'Deferrals and adjustments' above.